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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effect of market entry of new firms on incumbent firms' 
innovative activity measured as patent applications. The basic assumption is that the effect of 
entry varies by geographical distance between entrants and incumbents due to the presence of 
localized unobserved spillovers. In order to avoid endogeneity problems commonly 
associated with the timing of entry and entrants' location choice, I analyze entry induced by 
the establishment of university business incubators, which are usefully exogenous in time and 
space. The results show that entry has a statistically and economically significantly positive 
strategic effect on incumbent patenting which is attenuated by the geographical distance 
between entrant and incumbent. 
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\We never anticipated at Fairchild that a lot of other participants were going to enter
the business later on. So we tended to patent relatively few things [...]"
Gordon Moore (2004)
Since Schumpeter (1943) argued that monopolistic markets are more conducive to
innovation than competitive markets, there has been an active debate on the link be-
tween market structure and innovation. Arrow (1962) shows that entrants may have
larger incentives to innovate than an incumbent monopolist due to the replacement
eect, i.e., a monopolist loses its current stream of prots by innovating. Gilbert and
Newbery (1982) consider a model in which a monopolist and a potential competitor
invest in R&D to obtain an innovation. Once the innovation occurs, the winning rm
receives a patent of innite lifetime on the innovation. In their model, the rm that
invests more in R&D makes the innovation and receives the patent with certainty.
Contrary to Arrow's (1962) ndings, in such a set-up, the monopolist may have greater
incentives to invest in R&D for non-drastic process innovations. This is explained by
the fact that the monopolist has an incentive to invest more in R&D than the com-
petitor in order to ensure the absence of competition. This is due to the eciency
eect, i.e., the monopolist wants to preempt entry (Tirole, 1988). The problem with
this approach is that the rm that decides to invest more in R&D than its competitor
receives the innovation with certainty at a predetermined point in time. The outcome
of R&D, however, is far from deterministic; rms decide whether to invest in research
based on expectations with regard to payo and time by when the innovation will be
obtained. Reinganum (1983) introduces a stochastic model in which the probability of
success follows an exponential process. The arrival rate of innovations is a constant
function of a rm's investment in R&D and its expected prots are also constant over
time. In Reinganum's model, the monopolist has less incentives to innovate than the
competitor for drastic innovations.
The theoretical literature discussed so far does not yield clear predictions with
regard to the link between market structure and innovation and only considers a mono-
tonic relationship between the two. More recently, Aghion and Howitt and diverse
co-authors (1998, 2001, 2005, 2009) addressed the question of which market structure
is conducive to innovation allowing for a non-monotonic relation between innovation
and competition. Aghion, Harris, Howitt, and Vickers (2001), for example, explore the
question of how market structure impacts innovation and growth within the Aghion
and Howitt (1992) Schumpeterian growth model. In basic Schumpeterian models, such
2as Aghion and Howitt (1992), only outsiders innovate and constantly replace the cur-
rent incumbent. This is due to the fact that each time a rm innovates, it turns into
a monopolist as these models implicitly assume undierentiated Bertrand competition
and therefore the incumbent has no incentive to undertake R&D due to Arrow's re-
placement eect discussed above. If it is, however, assumed that there is more than one
single incumbent before an innovation occurs, in other words, there is imperfect com-
petition, Aghion et al. (2001) nd that under `neck-and-neck' competition, rms have
more incentives to innovate than in markets characterized by a leader and a follower.
This is due to the escape competition eect, i.e., innovating increases the incremen-
tal prot a rm can earn relative to not innovating as this avoids competition with a
`neck-and-neck' rival. Overall, these authors nd that a marginal increase in product
market competition always increases growth and therefore welfare. Aghion, Bloom,
Blundell, Grith, and Howitt (2005) extend the discussion of Aghion et al. (2001) and
nd empirically that the relation between product market competition and innovation
is governed by an inverted U-shape. This non-linear shape arises as initially, for a low
degree of competition, incentives to innovate are high as the incremental prot from
innovating is high with rms trying to escape competition through innovation. This is
particularly true for sectors in which rms compete at very similar costs, i.e., rms are
`neck-and-neck'. As competition rises, the reward for innovating falls for rms further
away from the technological frontier and overall innovative activity falls.
While this recent empirical work yields clear predictions with regard to the link
between market structure and innovation, it does not analyze the eect of entry on
incumbent innovative activity. Indeed, the empirical literature assessing entry and
incumbents' innovative activity is very limited. A notable exception is Aghion, Blun-
dell, Grith, Howitt, and Prantl (2009). They assess both the eect of foreign and
domestic rm entry on incumbent rm total factor productivity and innovative perfor-
mance, measured by incumbents' patent counts. The motivation for their analysis is
the observation that entry of foreign rms in the UK has had a heterogeneous eect on
incumbent TFP where positive eects are associated with technologically advanced UK
industries and negative ones with laggard industries. They demonstrate theoretically,
using a Schumpeterian multi-sector growth model, how the threat of entry has a dier-
ential impact on incumbent rms depending on how far these are from the technology
frontier. The model rests on the assumption that entrants are always at the technology
frontier, which may hold true in the case of large foreign rms entering. The authors la-
bel the two opposed eects as escape entry and discouragement eects. Domestic rms
close to the frontier speed up innovation while laggards see their expected prot from
innovating falling which leads them to reduce innovative eorts. In the empirical part
3of the paper, Aghion et al. are faced with principally two problems: (1) Entry threat is
unobserved and using actual entry even worsens the endogeneity problem inherent in
the analysis of the eect of entry on incumbent performance; (2) Distance to frontier is
also endogenous. To overcome problem (1), they use instruments obtained from policy
changes aecting the ease of (foreign) entry. To deal with (2), they link their UK data
with US data to determine a rm's distance to frontier.
While not explicitly stated, by conducting the analysis at the 4- (for TFP) and
3-digit (for patents) SIC sector level, Aghion et al. assume that any eect from en-
try works through the channel of product market competition. But imagine that the
foreign entrant has chosen a location in South East England, for example Oxfordshire.
Aghion et al. assume that the channel through which (foreign) entry aects TFP
and innovation of domestic rms is conned to domestic rms' competitive distance,
measured by their SIC code, as well as distance to the technology frontier. This as-
sumption implies that for two domestic rms, which are equally close to the frontier
but one located in Scotland and the other in London, the eect of (foreign) entry in Ox-
fordshire is the same conditional on other observable rm characteristics. Yet, if there
are unobservables, such as knowledge spillovers, which are locally conned, omitting
location may cause the main variable of interest, the entry variable, to be correlated
with the error term. Hence, if unobservable locally conned spillovers play a role, the
eect of entry should also vary according to the incumbents' location, i.e., geographical
distance to the entrant. In other words, if one assumes that an entrant also chooses
its location optimally, not only the moment of entry but also its location is endogenous.
Recently, location has been recognized as an important strategic choice variable for
rms in the empirical IO literature on market entry. This literature is mostly concerned
with the strategic interaction between rms, which means rms use their geographic
location as a tool to dierentiate themselves in order to create local market power. Seim
(2006), for example, proposes a model in which video stores can geographically dier-
entiate themselves. The choice of when and where to enter a market is made based on
the rm's expected post-entry prot across locations. Hence, rms are allowed to dier
in their protability according to their dierent locations and an idiosyncratic rm-
specic element. Therefore, rms decide on their location based on location-specic
demand characteristics, their expected competitors' choices, and on an idiosyncratic
shock aecting prots. Other examples for incorporating location as a choice variable
in rms' entry decisions include Mazzeo (2003), who looks at entry and location de-
cisions of motels at isolated exits on interstate highways in the US and Toivanen and
Waterson (2005), who look at the entry and location choices of McDonald's and Burger
4King in the UK. More recently Orhun (2006) looks at spatial positioning choices of
supermarkets in the US taking account of geographical distance between competitors
and also allowing for location-specic unobservables as well as asymmetric types of
retailers. Zhu and Singh (2006) propose a similar analysis of the US retail market also
allowing for asymmetry among rms. Jia (2008) analyzes the eect of market entry of
Wal-Mart and Kmart stores in US counties. Chain stores' location enters their prot
function as Jia allows for positive externalities (the `chain eect') from geographical
proximity between stores of the same chain by weighting the strategic eect by geo-
graphical distance between the markets in which stores are located. Overall, focusing
on the services sector, this literature has recognized the importance of strategic location
choice for rms' expected post-entry prots. Yet, none of these papers is concerned
with the eect of entry on incumbent rms' innovation activity.
In this paper, I propose a dierent approach to the question of how entry aects
innovation by incumbent rms accounting for rms' location choice. I exploit the re-
cent wave of new business incubators at universities in the UK.1 These incubators have
two convenient properties mitigating the problem of endogeneity of the timing as well
as location of entry. These incubators are located at a university and the decision to
establish an incubator is driven mostly by administrative and political factors. An incu-
bator's location is automatically determined by the university's location. Universities
have been in place in most cases for much longer than any rm in the sample, hence
their location can be regarded as exogenous and by extension also the location of the
incubator and the rms located in the incubator. The decision to set up an incubator
depends on a range of factors most of which are outside of a rm's inuence. Public
funds have to be secured, in most cases also nancial support from EU funds has to be
applied for, and the university and other public institutions have to provide their sup-
port. The dependence on the disbursement of public funds and administrational and
political factors produces some exogenous variation in the opening of the incubators
1Business Incubation is a unique and highly exible combination of business development processes,
infrastructure and people, designed to support entrepreneurs and grow new and small businesses, prod-
ucts and innovations through the early stages of development and/or change (UKBI, 2007). In other
words, business incubators provide start-up companies with a range of support measures, including
physical space within the incubator building, training and coaching, business contacts, access to -
nance etc. University incubators have the additional advantage that they can draw upon the resources
available at the university, including academic support, access to research facilities, as well as easy
access to the student pool to recruit employees. Note that incubators are distinct from science parks.
According to the denition by UK Science Park Association (UKSPA), science parks represent a cluster
of knowledge-based businesses, where support and advice are supplied to assist in the growth of the com-
panies. The most important distinguishing feature is that science parks are not restricted to start-up
companies and as a result may also host relatively large and well-established companies. For a broad
literature review on business incubators see Hackett and Dilts (2004).
5and thus of market entry of new rms located at these incubators when they open for
the rst time.
Hence, in order to assess the eect of market entry, I investigate the eect of the
establishment of university incubators and by extension of entry of the rms located
at the incubator (so called tenants) on innovation measured as patenting activity of
incumbent rms that are not located within the incubator. It is important to stress
that I look at tenants that enter the incubator and thus the market at the same point
in time as when the incubator was initially established. Identication of the entry
eect is obtained from location and timing, i.e., from variation in incumbent rms'
patenting behavior before and after entry of new rms induced by the establishment
of an incubator where the eect works through the channel of a rm's geographical
distance from entrants. The underlying assumption is that distance plays a role due to
unobservable spillovers originating from new rms aecting geographically close rms
more than distant ones.
Inuenced by localized spillovers, the determinants of an incumbent's observed de-
cision (not) to patent upon observing entry are of strategic nature. In order to take ac-
count of this strategic interaction, I estimate a discrete choice model for rms' patenting
decisions allowing for endogenous strategic eects. Importantly, I allow for two types of
strategic eects: other incumbent rms' patenting decisions as well as entrants' patent-
ing decisions. The coecient associated with entrants', i.e., tenant rms' patenting
decisions is the main object of interest of this paper.
While incubators serve in the rst place as a device to circumvent the endogeneity
problems associated with market entry, from a policy perspective, the investigation of
the eect of entry induced by incubators on incumbent rms is also interesting in its
own right. Incubators are considered among policy makers not only to provide bet-
ter opportunities for tenant rms, i.e., rms located within the incubator, but also to
generate externalities at the local, regional, and even the national level.2 One of the
most important contributions of incubators to the economy is to encourage entry of
new rms, which is assumed to generate spillovers for the economy. These spillovers
should thus contribute to enhancing innovation and competitiveness in the UK econ-
omy, inline with government objectives (DTI, 2003). Incubators, therefore, receive
considerable interest by policy makers and public nancial support. For example, in
2005, the UK Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) es-
2See website of UK Business Incubation (UKBI).
6tablished the Business Incubation Development Fund, which provides $5 million over
three years specically for business incubators. There is also the Higher Education
Innovation Fund (HEIF) - established in 2001 - which makes funds available to univer-
sities to strengthen knowledge transfer to the private sector, which includes funding of
own university incubators. Between 2001 and 2008, under this scheme total funding of
more than $500 million has been made available to universities, although there are no
gures available about the specic share used to support university incubators.3 Re-
gional Development Agencies (RDAs) also have a crucial role in the nancial support
of the establishment of incubators.4 Also the European Union European Regional De-
velopment Fund (ERDF) provides considerable nancial support to the establishment
of business incubators through university-specic schemes which have the objective to
encourage interaction between private business and universities. Despite the recent
wave of the establishment of new business incubators and the considerable resources
channeled into their support, I am not aware of any work attempting to quantify
the externality argument brought forward by proponents of public support to business
incubation. Hence, this paper also proposes the rst quantitative evidence on the issue.
The remaining sections of the paper will progress as follows. Section 2 discusses the
main advantages of using university incubators as a vehicle for identication of the eect
of market entry on incumbents' innovative behavior. Section 3 describes the empirical
approach taken and provides further assumptions made to ensure identication of the
model. The data set used for the analysis is described in Section 4. Section 5 outlines
the estimation procedure. Section 6 provides some descriptive statistics of the data
used in the analysis. Results are discussed in Section 7. Section 8 reports results from
several robustness tests. Section 9 concludes.
2 Identication
The empirical investigation of market entry on incumbent rm behavior is plagued by
an endogeneity problem. Entrants optimally choose their timing, market, as well as
physical location of entry. Hence, observed entry is correlated with both observed and
unobserved market and rm characteristics. To the degree that these characteristics are
observed, they can be included in the conditioning set of the regression function. Yet,
a large range of characteristics is unobserved. Therefore, the response by incumbents
may dier as a function of those unobservable market and rm characteristics. Aghion
3http://www.hefce.ac.uk/econsoc/buscom/heif/heif.asp
4Initially, RDAs received funds from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) amounting to
$54.1 million from the Regional Innovation Fund (RIF) during 2001. The RIF was subsumed into the
overall funds targeted at RDAs in 2002.
7et al. (2009), for example, address this issue by using policy changes, which in their
view, aected incumbents' innovative behavior exclusively through entry conditional on
observable market and rm characteristics as instruments for observed entry. Once one
also accounts explicitly for an entrant's location choice, such policy changes would have
to aect innovative behavior only through a rm's entry decision as well as location
choice. In the case of the rather sweeping policy changes used by Aghion et al., this
seems unlikely to be the case.5
University business incubators, in contrast, achieve precisely that. They provide
both exogenous timing of entry and choice of location:
Assumption 1 - Timing. The decision and timing of the establishment of an incu-
bator is the result of mostly administrational and political factors and therefore outside
of tenants' inuence. This produces exogenous variation in the timing of rms' entry
decisions.6
Assumption 2 - Location. An incubator's location is chosen according to the avail-
ability of space on a university campus and not according to other criteria that a rm
would usually optimally balance. Hence, tenant rms' geographical location choice con-
ditional on entering the market through an incubator is exogenous with respect to in-
cumbent rms.
To illustrate the underlying motivation for the establishment of a typical university
incubator, I use the example of the Technium Digital incubator located at the University
of Swansea, Wales. The incubator is part of a larger `Technium' network constructed
by the former Welsh Development Agency (WDA) starting in 2001 in partnership with
the University of Swansea to support the establishment of high-tech businesses. By
2007, the project had required investment of more than $42 million, which has come
from the WDA, the university, local authorities and most importantly EU structural
funds. This network constitutes the core of eorts of the Welsh Assembly Government
to promote the development of knowledge-based companies in Wales. Hence, the es-
tablishment of the incubator was government-led (see Abbey et al. (2008) for a more
detailed discussion). In terms of location, the Technium Digital incubator is located
directly on the same site as the University of Swansea (See Table 1).
5Aghion et al. use for example the EU Single Market Programme, monopoly and merger rulings by
the UK competition authority, and large scale privatization as instruments.
6The most likely scenario is the following: Assuming that an entrepreneur has decided to enter the
market through a university business incubator at a given point in time, this may not automatically
lead to market entry at the envisaged point in time due to dependence on the actual opening of an
incubator which may be delayed due to administrational and political reasons. This produces some
exogenous variation in the timing of entry.
8Geographical distance between incumbents and new entrants should play a role
if one assumes that there are localized spillovers that require physical proximity. I
therefore make the following additional assumption:
Assumption 3 - Spillovers. The eect of entry on incumbents' innovative activity
varies as a function of geographical distance because of the presence of unobserved spatial
spillovers.
Such spillovers may take various forms. One example may be information about
research activities carried out by rms within the incubator. Firms that are located ge-
ographically nearby may be better informed about these activities than rms far away.
Boschma (2005) notes that a `shared knowledge base' between rms is a prerequisite
for knowledge transmission. I therefore assume that such localized unobserved spatial
spillovers occur between rms within the same SIC 3-digit industries. There is ample
evidence for such localized spillovers in the literature. For example, Jae, Trajtenberg
and Henderson (1993) constructed a patent citation data set where they matched the
addresses of inventors to the addresses of those inventors that subsequently cited the
patent as prior art. They show that cited and citing researchers are geographically
closer than other researchers, which the authors interpret as evidence of localization
of spillovers. Dening US states as their spatial units of analysis, Audretsch and Feld-
man (1996) nd that even after controlling for geographical clustering of production,
knowledge-intensive industries cluster more than less knowledge-intensive industries.
These authors interpret this as evidence for localized spillovers and their importance.
Therefore, there is reason to believe that localized spillovers between rms, above all
high-tech rms, exist and are important in shaping rms' responses to market entry.
3 Empirical approach
The main objective of the analysis is to investigate whether entry of new rms through
the establishment of an incubator inuenced an incumbent rm's patenting propensity
where the eect is a function of geographical distance between entrant and incumbent
due to localized unobservable spillovers. In order to test this hypothesis, I propose
a simple patenting decision model in which I regard a rm's decision to patent as a
static discrete choice problem in which I allow for strategic interactions and incomplete
information, i.e., rms' interaction is modeled as a static Bayesian game.
There are i = 1;:::;N rms in the economy potentially simultaneously ling for a
patent. The location of incumbents is taken as given. Firms simultaneously decide
9whether to patent and I denote a rm's observed choice by pimt 2 f0;1g, where m
denotes markets, which are dened by 3-digit SIC industries (this implies that by con-
struction there are only potential `local' entrants).7 pimt = 1 means that rm i in
market m decided to patent at time t, while pimt = 0 means the opposite. The vector
of possible actions of all rms is denoted by P = f0;1gn, where p = (p1;:::;pn) denotes
a generic element of P. This implies that all rms have the same set of actions.
A rm's expected payo e from patenting is given by (where I omit time and
market subscripts to make the notation more readable)
e
i(pi;pj;xi;i;) = i(pi;pj;xi;)   i(pi) (1)
where j 6= i, i.e., j denotes other rms than i. xi 2 Xi denotes known state vari-
ables, i.e., rm and market-specic characteristics for rm i. Each rm is subject to
a stochastic shock i(pi) depending on its action pi. Apart from the shock, rm i's
payo depends also on its own as well as other rms' actions, pi and pj respectively.
The dependence on pj allows for strategic eects arising from other rms' patenting
decisions.8 In order to analyze the eect of entry on e
i, I will distinguish in the analysis
further below between strategic eects due to other incumbents and entrants. For now,
to save on notation, I subsume both types of strategic eects under pj.






j6=i pj if pi = 1
0 if pi = 0
(2)
The parameters ; have to estimated. I make a normalization in Equation (2) that
mean utility from not patenting is zero (see below Assumption 5 - Normalization).
I assume that a rm's decision to patent is a function of its own characteristics
as well as the random shock received. The corresponding strategy function is there-
fore pi = h(xi;i). It is important to note that only a rm's own shock  enters its
decision rule as I assume that other rms' shocks are unknown to the rm. Due to
the uncertainty about j's actions arising from the fact that rm i does not observe j's
idiosyncratic shock , rm i forms beliefs about j's patenting behavior. Firm i's beliefs
7About 66 percent of patenting rms in the sample le only a single patent application in a given
year and 82 percent le for either one or two patents in a given year. Hence, reducing the multinomial
to a binomial discrete choice problem is representative of the choice problem faced by the overwhelming
share of the sample rms.
8Note that I assume that players are limited to pure strategies, i.e., each player has a unique best
response with probability one. This assumption holds if i() is atomless.
10can be expressed as patenting probabilities. Hence, the probability that rm j chooses
action pj = 1 conditional on its state variables and idiosyncratic shock is
j(pj = 1jxj) =
Z
1fh(xj;j) = 1gf(j)dj (3)
where f(j) is the density of j and 1fh(xj;j) = 1g is an indicator function that
rm j chooses action pj = 1 conditional on its common knowledge state variables and
the private random shock.






j(pjjxj)   i(pi) (4)
Equation (4) gives rm i's expected payo from choosing action pi for a vector of
parameters  and beliefs about other rms' actions j() with j 6= i. Hence, rm i
chooses its action optimally such that
e
i > 0 (5)
If I assume that the random error i is standard normally distributed (see below










where  is the CDF of the standard normal distribution. Thus, in a Bayesian Nash







In equilibrium, the vector of probability functions maximizes the expected payo
for rm i for every state of xi taking other rms' j (where j 6= i) as given. Hence, in
a BNE, beliefs held by i about j's actions are j's best responses to its own beliefs.
Given the objective of my analysis, I rewrite the additive linear specication in









where ;;IN;EN are parameters to be estimated. The new term pktm denotes
patenting decisions by tenant rms k = 1;:::;K. The strategic eect of market entry
is captured by the term EN
P
k6=i pkmt, i.e., incumbent rms' beliefs about entrants'
patenting decisions. Given the one-to-one mapping of a rm's choice-specic pay-o
function and its choice probabilities, the model specication of Equation (8) can be
used to introduce separate strategic eects due to entrants and other incumbents into
(7) to obtain equilibrium choice probabilities i.
In order to assess the eect of localized spillovers captured by geographical distance
between entrants and incumbents, I weight the strategic entry variable by distance
between entrant and incumbent (which is equal to its distance from the incubator at
which the entrant is located). In addition, to capture the eect of varying distance on
incumbents patenting propensity, I compute strategic entry variables for three distance
bands. I allocate all rms located within a distance band of slightly less than 5 km,
which corresponds to the 2.5th percentile of the entire distance distribution, to the rst
distance band. The second distance band is dened for incumbents located within 5
km and 109 km from the entrant, which corresponds to the 2.5th and 30th percentile of
the size distribution. The third distance band contains all incumbents located beyond
109 km. In this sense, my model is similar to Orhun (2006), who also interacts the
strategic parameter with a continuous measure of distance between competitors and
uses distance bands similar to Seim (2006).9
I have data of the form fximt;pimt;pkmt;dik : m = 1;2;:::;M;i = 1;2;:::N;t =
1;:::;T;k = 1;:::;Kg, i.e., I have information on rm characteristics, market charac-
teristics, location and time of the establishment of an incubator and I know whether
incumbents and tenants applied for a patent. With this data, the model can be esti-
mated by a two-step Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimator as suggested by Bajari et
al. (2006) which will be discussed in detail in Section 5.
Before proceeding with a description of the data used in the analysis, I have to
9When using distance bands, one assumes that the strategic eect is the same for all rms within
the same band of distance whereas strategic eects can dier for rms in dierent distance bands.
The diculty lies in choosing cut-o distances to dene bands, which necessarily involves a somewhat
arbitrary decision. Section 8 reports a robustness check of my results with regard to the choice of
cut-o values of distance bands.
12return to the discussion of identication. Identication ensures that equilibrium choice
probabilities correspond uniquely to a rm's equilibrium payo and I am able to recover
the structural parameters  from the observed choice probabilities i(). Hence, dierent
primitives of the model should generate dierent choice probabilities if the model is
identied. Bajari et al. (2006) show how the above model is identied under the
following assumptions.
The rst assumption imposes a parametric assumption on the error term:
Assumption 4 - Error Distribution. The error term  is distributed standard nor-
mally, identically and independently across actions p and players i.10
The second assumption is the normalization made above:
Assumption 5 - Normalization. The payo for pi = 0 is normalized to zero: i(pi =
0;pj;xi;) = 0.
This normalization is helpful as in this type of model I am only able to identify
the the dierence between i(pi = 1;pj;xi;)   i(pi = 0;pj;xi;) but not each term
separately. In order to avoid the problem, I normalize i(pi = 0;pj;xi;) = 0 as stated
in Assumption 5 - Normalization.
A serious problem in games like the one described above is the possibility of multiple
equilibria, i.e., there is no unique relation between players' observed strategies and those
predicted by the model.11 This problem arises when rms' best response function are
not linear in other rms' decisions. Several approaches have been proposed in the
literature to deal with the problem of multiple equilibria. These solutions rely either
on additional structural assumptions or on a two-stage Maximum Likelihood approach
for estimation (Tamer, 2003; Aguirregabiria, 2004; Bajari et al., 2006). One structural
approach of avoiding the problem of multiple equilibria pioneered by Bresnahan and
Reiss (1990, 1991) for entry models of complete information is to assume that every
additional entrant lowers incumbent payo, which generates a recursive structure of
strategic interactions that has a unique equilibrium. This assumption is of little use
in this context as it is far from clear whether additional patents lower the payo from
incumbents' patents; in fact, the eect may a priori be positive or negative. In order
to avoid the problem of multiple equilibria, I make the following assumption:
10More generally, in order to ensure identication, one only has to assume that the distribution of
players' private information is from a known family (Rust, 1994).
11Existence of at least one equilibrium is guaranteed by Brower's Fixed Point Theorem since rms'
beliefs are continuous, monotonic and lie within the set (0;1) (Assumption 4 - Error Distribution).
Also note that the problem of multiple equilibria is distinct from the problem of non-identication. A
model may have multiple equilibria while it is still identied (Tamer, 2003).
13Assumption 6 - Unique Equilibrium. For a given value for the primitives of the
model, either the model has a unique equilibrium, or if the underlying model generates
multiple equilibria, rms select one equilibrium from the set of possible equilibria.
Finally, both i(pijx) and j(pjjx) depend on the common knowledge state variables
x. However, identication can be achieved through exclusion restrictions, i.e., rm-
specic payo shifters. If I assume that a rm's decision to patent is unaected by
other rms' state variables, identication can be achieved.
Assumption 7 - Exclusion Restriction. If Assumptions 4-6 hold, identication is
achieved if rm j inuences rm i's equilibrium payo only through j().
The choice of my exclusion restriction is discussed in Section 5.
4 Data
The data used for the analysis consists of three components. The rst component is
the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) data that covers the entire population of
registered UK rms.12 The FAME database is a commercial database provided by Bu-
reau van Dijk.13 To construct the data set, the December 2006 edition of FAME has
been used. The nancial data was updated using the December 2008 edition of FAME.
FAME covers around 2.04 million active rms. For all of these rms, basic information,
such as name, registered address, rm type, and industry code are available. Avail-
ability of nancial information varies substantially across rms. The smallest rms
are legally required to submit only very basic balance sheet information such as share-
holders' funds and total assets, which imposes severe constraints on the analysis of
start-up and small rms. The FAME database also lists around 0.9 million so called
`inactive' rms. These inactive rms are those that have exited the market and belong
to one of the following categories: dissolved, liquidated, entered receivership or declared
non-trading. Also, FAME gives exact dates for market entry in the form of a rm's
incorporation date which I use in order to ensure that tenant rms entered the market
at the time when incubators were set up. Geographical distances between rms have
been obtained by matching rms' postcodes available in FAME with Code-Point data
provided by Edina Digimap.14 The Code-Point data provides a precise geographical
location for each postcode unit in the United Kingdom determined by its National
12FAME downloads data from Companies House records. In the remainder of this work I use rms
to mean registered rms. Hence rm refers to the legal entity that organizes production, in contrast to
census-type data that uses the plant or production unit.
13http://www.bvdep.com/en/FAME.html
14http://digimap.edina.ac.uk/main/index.jsp
14Grid co-ordinates given by Easting and Northing values and therefore allows a fairly
accurate determination of distances between two objects in the United Kingdom.15
The second component is the intellectual property (IP) data, consisting of patents
and trademarks. The patent data used here comes from the European Patent Oce
(EPO) Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) version September 2008.
Only patents applied for at the UK Intellectual Property Oce (UKIPO) with the
objective of obtaining patent protection in the UK, so called UK patents, have been
extracted from PATSTAT. This analysis uses the application date of UK patents. How-
ever, only patents that have been published are in the public domain. Hence, it is
not possible to observe those patents that were withdrawn before their publication.
But given the usual 18 months period between application and publication date, all
patents that made it to the publication stage should be included in the data set. Trade-
mark data, both UK trademark publications and Community (OHIM) marks registered,
comes from Marquesa Ltd. The patent and trademark data were matched to FAME.16
The third component consists of specic information on university incubators in-
cluding location, year of establishment, and tenant rms. For this component of the
data set, I collected information on the existence of incubators at 139 British universi-
ties.17 I found 80 out of these 139 universities (58 percent) to oer business incubator
facilities to start-up companies. Some of the universities are associated with more than
one incubator so that I identied a total of 125 incubators. Tables 11-14 show the com-
plete list of universities and their corresponding incubators. I contacted all of the 139
universities in order to verify that the information is correct. Universities / incubators
that did not respond were contacted again. The nal response rate was slightly above
80 percent. Since the rm-level data is available only for the period 2000-2005, I kept
only incubators in the sample that were established between 2001 and 2004.18 This
left me with a sample of 49 incubators (these incubators are marked in bold in Tables
11-14). Out of these 49 incubators, I excluded the Edinburgh Pre-Incubator Scheme
(EPIS) because tenant rms are not physically located at the incubator, which violates
15Given the grid points for rms i and j, Euclidean distances are calculated as Distance = p
j northingi   northingj j2 + j eastingi   eastingj j2.
16For more information on the matching process see Helmers and Rogers (2009) and Rogers, Helmers
and Greenhalgh (2007).
17Initially, I looked at a sample of 162 British institutes of higher education (HEIs), but I discarded
23 institutes which are specialized in subjects which normally do not give any incentive to start-up a
high-tech company at an incubator. Examples for such specialized institutions are the Royal Academy
of Music or the Royal Scottish Academy of Music and Drama.
18Here again the assumption that the moment of the establishment of an incubator is exogenous
with respect to incumbent rm performance is essential to avoid any selection bias from restricting the
sample to this specic period of time.
15the location assumption (Assumption 2 - Location). Similarly, I also dropped the
European Centre for Marine Biotechnology as the incubator is located in a dierent
region than the institute it belongs to, the UHI Millennium Institute, since this also vi-
olates the location assumption for identication and appears to be a very unusual type
of incubator. Then also the Think Business incubator at the University of Bradford,
the Stepping Stones incubator at Keele University, the SureStart incubator at the Uni-
versity of Stirling, and the Business Mine incubator at the University of Hudderseld
were dropped as they cater to student start-ups which are highly unlikely to operate in
innovative sectors conducting any sort of R&D which would lead to patentable inno-
vations. Finally, also the Hive incubator at Nottingham Trent University was dropped
from the sample as it accommodates only ventures previous to their incorporation,
thus before they enter the market. This leaves a set of 42 incubators. It is noteworthy
that the establishment of incubators appears to be a very recent phenomenon since
around 75% of all incubators were established since 2000.19 The emergence of such a
large number of new university business incubators across the entire UK corroborates
my main identifying assumptions Assumption 1 - Timing and Assumption 2 -
Location.
I then identied tenant rms located at the incubators established between 2001 and
2004. For this purpose, I used information from three sources. Firstly, most incubators
oer an overview of their tenants, i.e., indicate the names of companies located at the
incubator on their websites. The so obtained names were then used to retrieve the com-
panies in FAME. However, it turned out that the information provided was sometimes
not complete or entirely accurate and a relatively large number of rms could not be
found in FAME.20 Moreover, since I am interested in tenants that were located at the
incubator in the moment when it opened, websites often do not contain names of those
tenants as they may have left the incubator by 2009. When I was able to nd tenants
based on their rm name in FAME, I also veried that rms were incorporated during
the same year as the incubator while allowing for an additional margin of 3 months.
In a second step, to complement the information of step one, I searched in FAME for
rms located at the same postcode as an incubator, i.e., the only search criterion is the
incubator's postcode. For some incubators, this search method lead to a considerable
number of false matches, i.e., rms that share the same postcode with an incubator but
that are actually not located at the incubator. Hence, to rene the search algorithm,
19One possible explanation for this is the dramatic increase in the availability of funding in the UK
and EU for universities to promote knowledge transfer and business links during this time period.
20In order to avoid possible mismatches from using a search-algorithm, I searched manually for all
possible tenants given the information provided on incubator websites.
16I used additional information obtained from rms that I had identied in step one to
be indeed located at an incubator. Using a search algorithm based on an incubator's
postcode as well as specic indicators in a rm's address allowed to retrieve more rms
which could not be identied using only the information provided on incubators' web-
sites. Again, I kept only rms that were incorporated during the same year as the
incubator allowing for an additional margin of 3 months. Thirdly, I contacted all
universities and/or the corresponding incubators and asked them to verify the list of
tenants that I had obtained from steps one and two. In cases where I was unable to
retrieve any tenants in step one and two, I had to rely entirely on information obtained
from universities/incubators. Unfortunately, a number of universities/incubators were
unable to provide me with the necessary information principally due to condentiality
issues which led me to drop these incubators from the sample unless I had identied
tenants in the rst two steps.21
After also dropping tenant rms that had incomplete records, for example missing
primary SIC codes, or which report an incorporation date previous to the establishment
of the incubators in which they are hosted, I am left with a sample of 30 incubators
for which I was able to identify tenant rms. Table 1 shows the incubators founded
between 2001 and 2004 for which I was able to identify tenant rms and indicates the
university these incubators belong to. The table indicates that the mean and median
distance between a university and its incubator is 1.32 km and 0.42 km respectively,
which eectively means that both are located at the same location. Figure 1 shows
their location on a map. The map provides further support for the location assump-
tion (Assumption 2 - Location) as it highlights the co-location of universities and
incubators.
The rms that have been identied to have been located at an incubator at the





k6=i pkmt. Hence, the information on tenant rms gives a measure of pktm
and therefore allows me to specically estimate the eect of entry of these new rms on
incumbent innovative performance within each market m in which entry has occurred
through any of the incubators listed in Table 1. Table 2 indicates the number of en-
trants for each incubator.
The set of incumbent rms is drawn from FAME and consists of any incumbent
21I also asked universities/incubators for specic entry and exit dates of tenants into and out of
incubators which would have allowed to rene the analysis further, but faced the same data protection
barrier.
17rms that (1) belong to a 3-digit SIC industry in which entry occurred through the
establishment of an incubator (see Table 2), (2) report data both before and after the
establishment of an incubator, i.e., entry of new rms, and (3) had at least one patent
during the period 2000-2005.22 Condition (1) shows that I also maintain the assump-
tion of the existing literature discussed above that the eect of entry works through
product market competition.
Overall, there are 2,591 incumbents satisfying conditions (1), (2) and (3) and 128
entrants that could be identied through the three-step procedure outlined above.
5 Estimation
To estimate Equation (7), I implement a two-step Pseudo Maximum Likelihood proce-
dure as suggested by Bajari et al. (2006). The diculty in estimating (7) arises from
the endogeneity of the strategic eects and ignoring this endogeneity would result in
biased in inconsistent estimates.
Since the equilibrium is assumed to be a function of only the observed state vari-
ables, in a rst stage, consistent estimates of a rm's beliefs can be obtained from a
reduced form nonparametric regression of a rm's state variables on its observed patent-
ing decision. The estimated beliefs can then be used in a second stage to account for
strategic eects in order to recover the structural parameters. Bajari et al. (2006) show
that this two-stage procedure generates consistent estimates of the structural parame-
ters.
In the rst step, I use both incumbent and tenant rms to estimate consistently
individual rms' beliefs ^ i() about their patenting behavior in market m nonpara-
metrically through a nonparametric conditional mode estimator (Collomb et al., 1987;
Li and Racine, 2007) instead of sieve series expansion as in Bajari et al. (2006).23 I
have data on actual patenting behavior and rm-level as well as market characteris-
tics (pimt;ximt), I therefore estimate the conditional mode of (pjx), which is denoted
as  = maxp g(pjx) where g(pjx) is the conditional density of p given x. The con-
ditional mode ^  can be estimated using a generalized product kernel estimator for
g(pjx) =
g(x;p)
g(x) where the conditional density g() is estimated using the nonparametric
conditional density estimator proposed by Hall et al. (2004), i.e.,
22As a robustness check Section 8 reports results when extending the period to 1996-2005, i.e., also
including rms in the incumbent rm set that patented before the beginning of the sample period.























notes a r  1 vector of discrete regressors, Xc
i denotes a q  1 vector of continuous
regressors. Xis denotes the sth component of Xi. w is a symmetric, nonnegative uni-
variate kernel function and hs is the smoothing parameter for xc
s with 0 < hs < 1.
1(Xd
is 6= xd
s) is an indicator function assuming the value of one if Xd
is 6= xd
s and zero
otherwise.  is the smoothing parameter for the discrete regressors with 0  s  1.
kh0(p;Pi) = h 1
0 k((p   Pi)=h0) with h0 being the bandwidth for p. The corresponding
bandwidths are chosen according to the Silverman (1986) rule of thumb 1:06^ n 1=5 to
ease the computational burden.
I include in the rst-stage regression as state variables a rm's total assets, its age,
its number of directors as a proxy for employment and managerial as well as technical
expertise available to the rm,24 its number of trademarks, and the 3-digit SIC-level
measure for market structure. The set of conditioning variables is limited due to data
availability constraints. Tenant rms that have just entered the market are (at least
initially) micro-sized companies and therefore legally not obliged to report a large range
of nancial data. The minimum set of information that is available for most start-up
companies constitutes my set of conditioning variables.
In the second stage, I drop tenant rms from the sample, as the objective of the
second approach is to assess the eect of beliefs formed about entrants' patenting be-
havior on incumbent actual patenting behavior. For the second stage, as discussed, I
have to assume that the error term is normally i.i.d. distributed to ensure identica-
tion. Further, given Assumption 5 - Normalization, I can invert the equilibrium
choice probability to obtain an estimate of the rm's payo function. The structural
parameters can then be recovered in a second step by estimating a simple probit esti-
mator assuming that Assumptions 4, 6, and 7 hold. The corresponding log likelihood
function is:
24Availability of employment data in FAME is extremely limited - above all for smaller rms. For

















(1   pimt)ln[1   (imt(pimt;pjmt;ximt;))] (10)
where imt() is dened as in Equation (8) and obtained from using the estimates of
step one. For the second stage, I drop a rm's number of directors from the estimation
sample. Hence, I assume that the number of rm j's directors aects rm i's patenting
propensity exclusively through its direct impact on j as laid out in Assumption 7 -
Exclusion Restriction. At the market level, I drop the 4-rm concentration ratio and
use instead the total entry rate of new rms, which was computed using the entire pop-
ulation of rms, i.e., it is based on patentees as well as non-patentees. Since predicted
values are used in stage two, instead of relying on analytical methods for inference, I
rely on bootstrapping.25 I include time and industry xed eects in the second stage
to account for possible trends in the data and time-invariant industry-specic factors.
Note that the the structural parameters are identied only up to a scale, i.e., 
sd, where
sd denotes the standard deviation. I therefore make the following normalization sd = 1.
While the two-step estimator is not a full information estimator such as for example
the nested xed-point estimator (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2002; Seim, 2006), the two-
step estimator represents a convenient choice for the purpose of this analysis as it is
computationally simple which is important considering the relatively large number of
observations in the empirical analysis. Also, the large number of observations makes
the well-known problem of nite sample bias associated with the estimator less relevant.
6 Descriptive Analysis
In this section, I present a descriptive analysis of the data. Table 3 provides an overview
of the main characteristics of incumbent rms. As discussed above, I use only a limited
set of conditioning variables, a rm's total assets,26 age, the number of a rm's direc-
tors as a proxy for employment and managerial as well as technical expertise available
to the rm, number of trademarks, the entry rate at the 3-digit industry level and a
25Bajari et al. (2006) show that the asymptotic variance of the second-stage estimates is independent
of the choice of nonparametric estimator in stage one and structural parameters estimated in stage two
are asymptotically normal.
26Total assets were deated using a GDP deator from the UK HM Treasury (Version December
2008).
20measure of market structure at the SIC 3-digit level. The market-level variables were
computed based on all rms available in FAME in order to reect appropriately rms'
environment.
Figure 2 shows the percentage of patenting rms among incumbents over the sample
period 2000-2005. The share of patenting rms in a given year varies between approxi-
mately 34 percent in 2000 and 25 percent in 2005. Overall, the percentage of patenting
rms per year gradually declines during the period analyzed. This drop in patentees
can to some extent be explained by generally lower patenting activity in the UK during
later years of the sample (Rogers et al., 2007). This nding suggests the importance
of controlling for a common trend in the data when implementing the empirical model
presented in Section 3.
Table 3 indicates that on average a rm's number of patents is 0.673. For trade-
marks, the mean is slightly higher and also the standard deviation is with 4.566 consid-
erably larger than for patents which have a standard deviation of 2.963. The average
size of rms is $485 million which diers considerably from the median of $101,000.
This is due to a highly skewed size distribution of rms which is also evident from the
interquartile range of $121,000 and $6.649 million.27 Incumbent rms are relatively
young, as average rm age is around 14 years. This shows that I can comfortably treat
universities' location as predetermined in my data set. The median number of directors
is six, which is not too dierent from the mean of slightly more than eight.
Table 4 reports p-values for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test where I test the null hy-
pothesis that tenant rms' size measured as total assets is equal to the size of all other
entrants within the same SIC 3-digit industry in the same year. The results show that
in nearly all cases, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, which suggests that tenant
rms are not dierent from other entrants when looking at size.
Finally, Table 5 shows the transition matrix of rms' observed choice of whether to
patent across time. The matrix reveals that there is little persistence in rms' patenting
decision as only slightly more than 30 percent of patentees in one period also patent in
the following period. This descriptive evidence supports my modeling decision to treat
a rm's discrete choice problem as static.
27In order to verify whether this highly skewed size distribution has any eect on my results, Section
8 reports results when dropping the bottom and top deciles of the rm size distribution as measured
by total assets.
217 Results
Table 6 shows the confusion matrix resulting from the rst-stage nonparametric re-
gression. It shows that the nonparametric model predicts 87.7 percent of the actual
observed patenting choices correctly whereas the parametric probit as a comparison
predicts only 72.6 percent correctly. Importantly, the probit model fares considerably
worse than the nonparametric estimator with respect to correctly predicting the out-
come pitm = 1.
The predicted patenting choices from the rst stage are used in the second stage
to estimate Equation (10). Table 7 shows the corresponding results (all coecients
are expressed as marginal eects). The rst column shows a specication with rm-
and market-level characteristics, total assets, age, number of trademarks, as well as the
industry-level entry rate as independent variables. In the rst column, strategic eects
are measured by IN
P
j6=i pjmt and EN
P
k6=i pkmt, i.e., I do not use distance between
entrant and incumbent. In the second column, I use distance to rewrite the strategic
eect of entry as ^ kmt()=dik. The third column reports the results obtained when dis-
cretizing the geographical distance between entrants and incumbents into three distance
bands as discussed in Section 3. In columns (2) and (3), I add incubator xed eects.
This means a zero-one indicator that is zero if an incumbent does not experience entry
by a rm located at a specic incubator and one once entry occurred by a rm located
at the incubator. Columns (4) and (5) use incubator xed eects which are weighted by
the geographical distance between the incumbent and the incubator, which introduces
cross-sectional variation in the incubator specic eects. These incubator-specic ef-
fects capture factors associated with unobserved incubator characteristics which may
inuence the eect of entry on incumbents. Since these characteristics are assumed to
be incubator-specic, they may indeed be expected to be time-invariant.
The marginal eect of a rm's total assets on patenting propensity of incumbents
is statistically signicant and positive. A rm's total assets can be interpreted as a
measure of rm size. Hence, the coecients imply a positive correlation of patenting
propensity and rm size. The eect of a rm's number of trademarks is also posi-
tive. Trademarks can be regarded as a proxy for a rm's familiarity with IP and may
capture some form of sunk cost associated with acquiring IP. Therefore, rms taking
out trademarks may be able to distribute xed costs associated with IP, such as ac-
quiring knowledge on the IP system or employing an IP manager, across patents and
trademarks or simply be more familiar with the IP application process and therefore
are more likely to patent. However, this eect is not statistically signicant. A rm's
22age is negatively associated with incumbents' patenting propensity, which may point to
younger rms being more innovative than older ones. The entry rate at the 3-digit SIC
level is negatively associated with patenting, which may be given the interpretation
that more competitive markets are associated with lower patenting activity in line with
Schumpeter's arguments (Schumpeter, 1943).
The marginal eects of the results shown in Table 7 indicate that the strategic ef-
fect of other incumbent rms' patenting activity is in magnitude eectively zero and
the regression results across all specications also indicate that the coecients are
statistically not dierent from zero. A possible interpretation for this nding is that
incumbent rms nd themselves already in an equilibrium and beliefs held about other
incumbents do not aect a rm's own patenting activity. Regarding the eect of en-
try, in the rst column, the eect of entry measured without accounting for distance
between entrants and incumbents is positive and statistically dierent from zero. Di-
viding the strategic eect by distance between entrant and incumbent in Column (2)
results in a considerable increase in the marginal eect associated with entry. Eval-
uating the marginal eect at the mean of the entry variable ^ kmt()=dik for Column
(2), yields the prediction that an increase in beliefs about entrants' patenting activity
by one unit, increases incumbents' patenting propensity by 16 percentage points in a
statistically signicant way. This eect increases to 17 percentage points in Column
(4) when incubator dummies are scaled by distance between incubators and incumbents.
In order to verify the eect of distance on incumbent patenting propensity, Columns
(3) and (5) report results using distance bands. The results in Columns (3) and (5)
suggest that the eect of entry on incumbents decays distinctly with increased distance
given the reduced size of the coecients of distance bands 2 and 3 relative to the coef-
cient associated with entry within distance band 1. Evaluating the marginal eect at
the mean, the variables in Columns (3) and (5) indicate that an increase of one unit of
the strategic entry variable within distance band 1 is associated with an increase of 0.9
and 1.5 percentage points respectively in incumbent patenting propensity. Whereas an
increase of one unit of the strategic entry variable within distance band 2 results only
in a 0.02 percentage point increase for both specications displayed in Columns (3) and
(5). The eect of entry in distance band 3, however, is negligible from an economic
point of view although statistically signicantly dierent from zero. Therefore, the
drastically falling magnitude of the coecients associated with entry in the dierent
distance bands shows the importance of geographical proximity in inducing a reaction
in innovative activity of incumbents.
23Overall, these ndings suggest that there is a positive association with the entry
of new rms and incumbent patenting activity. The results suggest that patenting
activity of entrants, weighted by distance between the incumbent and entrant, increases
the propensity of an incumbent patenting. The results obtained when using distance
bands imply that the eect of entry is stronger for incumbents that are closer to the
entrant rm - a nding consistent with the notion of localized spillovers.
8 Robustness
In this section, I report results from a number of robustness tests. I vary the set of
incumbents by (a) including any rm that has patented between 1996 and 1999 in any
of the sectors that experienced entry through a tenant rm, and (b) also dropping rms
in the tails of the size distribution. In addition, I use dierent cut-o values to dene
distance bands to assess the robustness of the ndings reported in Section 7.
One of the criteria for choosing the set of incumbents is patenting activity between
2000 and 2005, i.e., only rms are included in the sample of incumbents that have
applied for at least one UK patent between 2000 and 2005. In order to avoid sample
selection based on the left-hand-side variable, I enlarge the incumbent set by also in-
cluding rms that have patented before the beginning of the sample period, i.e., between
1996 and 1999. Table 9 reports the corresponding results. The sample size increased
only slightly from 11,832 to 11,961 observations. The overall results are qualitatively
very similar to the original results shown in Table 7. This dissipates concerns that one
may have regarding the use of patenting activity within the sample period as a criterion
for dening incumbent rms.
One of the most prominent concerns in empirical work at the rm level is the ex-
tremely skewed size distribution of rms. The summary statistics on rms' total assets
shown in Table 3 suggest that this is also the case for the sample of rms used in this
analysis. To test whether my results are driven by particularly large or small rms,
I drop all incumbent rms from the sample which are in the tails of the distribution
of total assets. More specically, I drop rms that report average assets below the
10th or above the 90th percentile of the distribution. The results are reported in Table
10. The coecients for the eect of entry ^ kmt()=dik are still positive and statistically
signicant at the 1 percent level. When distance bands are used, the magnitude of the
marginal eects associated with the dierent distance bands remain largely the same
as in Table 7. Thus, these results suggest that there is still a positive eect of entry
on incumbents' patenting propensity which decays with increased distance between en-
24trants and incumbents.
Table 8 shows the results that are obtained when distance bands are dened using
dierent percentiles of the distance distribution. Incumbent rms are now allocated
within the rst distance band if they are located within a radius of slightly less than
19 km from the entrant which corresponds to the 5th percentile of the distance dis-
tribution. The second distance band ranges up to 95 km, which corresponds to the
25th percentile. The third band contains all remaining incumbents rms. The results
displayed in Table 8 show that the overall pattern of coecients associated with entry
across the dierent distance bands is very similar to the one shown in Table 7. Although
the magnitude of the marginal eects for the rst distance band is smaller. Given that
the rst band includes more remote rms than the distance band used for the main
results of Table 7, these ndings lend further support to the localization of spillovers
and the entry eect being stronger the closer the incumbent is located to the entrant.
Finally, another issue relates to the overall quality of universities. If an incubator is
associated with a top university, its tenants rms may be of higher quality than that of
other universities. Hence, the eect of entry induced by top-university incubators could
potentially be dierent from that induced by other universities. Column (2) of Table 1
contains the overall rank of universities resulting from the 2001 Research Assessment
Exercise (RAE).28 The ranks show that the sample contains incubators associated
with universities from the entire quality spectrum. Imperial College is ranked second
while the University of Derby is ranked 102nd. Most incubators are associated with
universities that are ranked somewhere in the middle of the distribution. Apart from
purging possible time-invariant quality eects through incubator xed eects, the fact
that the sample consists of incubators associated with universities of very diverse RAE
ranks, makes it very unlikely that my results are driven by few entrants associated with
top-university incubators.
9 Conclusion
The paper analyzes the eect of entry of new rms on incumbent rms' patenting ac-
tivity. So far, there exists very little research on this topic, which may be explained by
the type of endogeneity problem inherent in the analysis of market entry. To address
28The RAE collects information on all UK universities, including an assessment of the `quality' of
research. The method of assessing quality is predominantly based on publications of faculty and,
specically, the type and ranking of journals these publications were made in. Hence, the RAE is a
rather research-oriented ranking which is more appropriate for my purpose than teaching-quality based
rankings.
25this problem, I propose to analyze the eect of entry induced by the establishment of
university incubators, i.e., of new rms located at these incubators. This allows me
to treat the timing and location choice of new rms as exogeneous in my analysis. I
can therefore concentrate on modeling incumbent rms' patenting decisions taking the
moment of entry as well as geographical location of the new rm as given. My empir-
ical model allows for two types of strategic eects. First, incumbent rms patenting
behavior may be inuenced by patenting behavior of other incumbents. Second, en-
trant rms may inuence incumbents' patenting activity. Moreover, I assume that this
strategic eect of entry varies according to geographical distance between incumbents
and entrants. There is a large body of literature supporting the argument in favor of
distance aecting strategic eects between rms in the presence of localized spillovers.
It is this strategic eect that constitutes the main object of interest of this paper.
My ndings suggest that entry spurs incumbent patenting. Moreover, this entry
escalation eect is attenuated by geographical distance between the entrant and the
incumbent. The closer an incumbent rm is to an entrant, the stronger the entry es-
calation eect will be. The main explanation for the role played by physical distance
is the presence and importance of localized spillovers in strategic interaction between
rms.
Regardless of the progress made in this paper in terms of assessing the eect of
entry on incumbent innovative activity, the analysis opens new questions. The nd-
ings suggest that patenting behavior is at least to some extent strategic. However, the
analysis is unable to unveil the precise strategic motivations of incumbent rms which
induce them to respond to entry with increased patenting. There are many candidate
explanations: this behavior may serve as a signalling device to deter other potential
entrants, as a way of anticipating knowledge leakage by making information accessible
to the public through a patent publication, or as a response to increased competition in
the spirit of the escape entry eect of Aghion et al. (2005). Boldrin and Levine (2008)
argue that incumbents have a strong interest in preserving their competitive advantage
through patents. However, their argument is dierent from the Schumpeterian argu-
ment, i.e., they are not arguing that incumbents have larger incentives to innovate, but
rather that they have strong incentives to protect their status quo by patenting their
inventions and blocking entrants. From this perspective, it is not even clear whether
it is indeed benecial that incumbents react to entry by increased patenting activity if
this is interpreted as strategically blocking entrants from eectively competing in the
market. More research is needed to analyze strategic patenting behavior in more detail.
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29Figure 1: Location of universities and incubators
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33Table 3: Summary Statistics - Incumbents
Variable Mean Median 25% 75% St. Dev.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No. UK Patents 0.673 0 0 1 2.963
No. Trademarks 0.678 0 0 0 4.566
Assets ($million) 485.857 0.101 0.121 6.649 11,701
Age (years) 14.685 9 5 18 16.394
No. Directors 8.251 6 4 10 7.015
Entry Rate (3-digit SIC) 0.131 0.123 0.081 0.173 0.068
CR4 (3-digit SIC) 0.326 0.254 0.185 0.472 0.185
Entrant Patent 0.295 0.083 0 0.535 0.396
Incumbent Patent 154.849 121.958 58.463 205.349 116.591
34Table 4: Comparison: Total Assets of Tenants vs. all other Entrants (FAME)
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test - H0 distributions equal)
SIC P-Value





















722 0.440 0.692 0.677
724 0.829 0.340
726 0.883 0.498 0.736 0.627
731 0.661 0.294 0.023 0.574
732 0.324 0.689
741 0.426 0.689 0.036 0.078
743 0.191 0.506
744 0.813
748 0.065 0.931 0.018 0.549
803 0.023
804 0.341 0.652 0.569
851 0.298 0.218
911 0.290
921 0.860 0.922 0.820
923 0.397 0.325 0.491
926 0.566
930 0.735 0.678
Table 5: Transition matrix: Patenting persistence of incumbents
Patent = 0 Patent = 1
Patent = 0 73.74 26.26
Patent = 1 69.91 30.09
35Table 6: 1st stage nonparametric conditional mode estimator - confusion matrix (for











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37Table 8: Robustness Test - Distance Band Denition: Results for 2nd Stage Probit
(Marginal eects - evaluated at mean for continuous variables)
Covariates Patent dummy
(1) (2)
Entrant Patent Distance Band 1 0.006* 0.009**
(0.003) (0.003)
Entrant Patent Distance Band 2 0.003** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
Entrant Patent Distance Band 3 0.001** 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000)
Incumbent Patent 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000)
ln Assets 0.020** 0.020**
(0.002) (0.002)
ln Age -0.018** -0.019**
(0.006) (0.007)
No of Trademarks 0.007 0.007
(0.005) (0.005)




Year Dummies Included Included
Sector Dummies Included Included
No. Obs. 11,832 11,832
Notes:
1.
+ indicates signicance at 10%; * at 5%; ** at 1%.
2. As a robustness check the distance bands are dened based on the percentiles
of the distribution of the distance between entrants and incumbents: Distance
Band 1 for distance5th percentile; Distance Band 2 for distance>5th per-
centile and distance25th percentile; Distance Band 3 for distance>25th per-
centile.
3. There are 30 incubator dummies which assume the value of 1 if an incumbent
rm experiences entry of a tenant rm from a specic incubator. Otherwise its
value is 0.
4. Incubator/Distance are 30 variables which are the incubator dummies divided





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40Table 11: Overview University Incubators
University Incubator Start Year
Anglia Ruskin University
Arts Institute at Bournemouth Enterprise Pavillion 2005
Aston University Faraday Wharf 2001
Aston University iBIC 2005




Bishop Grosseteste University Sky Centre 2007
Bournemouth University Innovation Centre 2001
Brunel University Brunel Science Park 1986
Buckinghamshire New University Buckingham House 2009
Canterbury Christ Church University
Cardi University Cardi Medicentre 1992
Cardi University Cardi Business Technology Centre 1988
City University, London
Coventry University The TechnoCentre (Innovation Centre) 1998
Craneld University Business Incubation Centre 2005
Craneld University Craneld University Technology Park 1991
De Montfort University De Montfort Innovation Centre 1995
Durham University NETPark 2004
Edge Hill University
Glasgow Caledonian University Biotech Incubator 2003
Goldsmiths College
Harper Adams University College
Heriot Watt University Research Park 1971
Imperial College London Imperial Incubator 2006
Imperial College London Low Carbon Technology Incubator 2004
Institute of Cancer Research
Keele University Stepping Stones 2002
King's College London
Kingston University
Lancaster University Daresbury Innovation Centre 2005
Lancaster University InfoLab21 2004
Lancaster University Centre for Ecology and Hydrology 2007
Leeds Metropolitan University Leeds Metropolitan Business Incubator 2001
Leeds Trinity & All Saints
Liverpool Hope University
Liverpool John Moores University Digitalinc 2002
Liverpool John Moores University Liverpool Science Park 2006
London Business School
London Metropolitan University Digital Media Innovation Centre 2004
London School of Economics and Political Science
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
London South Bank University London Knowledge Innovation Centre 2006
Loughborough University Loughborough Innovation Centre 2002
Loughborough University Loughborough Science Park 2004
Manchester Metropolitan University Innospace 2007




Newcastle University CELS at Newcastle 2006
Newman University College
North East Wales Institute of Higher Education
Northumbria University NETPark 2004
Nottingham Trent University The Hive 2001
Oxford Brookes University
Queen Margaret University
Queen Mary, University of London BioEnterprises Innovation Centre 2009
41Table 12: Overview University Incubators




Royal College of Art
Royal Holloway, University of London Royal Holloway Enterprise Centre 2002
Royal Veterinary College London BioScience Innovation Centre 2001
School of Pharmacy
Scottish Agricultural College (SAC)
Sheeld Hallam University The Hatchery 2005
Southampton Solent University
St George's Hospital Medical School
Staordshire University
Swansea Institute of Higher Education
Thames Valley University





University for the Creative Arts Mode Future 2005 (closed 2007)
University of Aberdeen University of Aberdeen 2009
University of Abertay Embreonix 2000
University of Bath Carpenter House 2002
University of Bedfordshire
University of Birmingham Birmingham Research Park 1986
University of Bolton
University of Bradford IPI Bioscience Business Incubator 2003
University of Bradford Think Business 2004
University of Brighton
University of Bristol SETsquared Business Acceleration Centre 2003
University of Cambridge St Johns Innovation Centre Limited 1987
University of Cambridge Cambridge Science Park 1970
University of Central Lancashire Northern Lights 2007
University of Central Lancashire West Lakes Science & Technology Park 2009




University of Derby Bank's Mill Studios 1999
University of Derby ID Centre Derby 2002
University of Derby Network House Derby 2001
University of Dundee Dundee University Incubator 2005
University of Dundee Springeld Incubator 2002
University of Dundee The Greenhouse 2002
University of East Anglia Norwich Bio-Incubator 2001
University of East London Royal Docks /Knowledge Dock 1999/2006
University of Edinburgh Scottish Microelectronics Centre 2000
University of Edinburgh Edinburgh Technology Transfer Centre 1987
University of Edinburgh ETTC BioSpace 2005
University of Edinburgh ETTC@Informatics 2008
University of Edinburgh Edinburgh Pre-Incubator Scheme (EPIS) 2004
University of Essex Business Incubation Centre 2007
University of Essex Research Park under construction
University of Exeter The Innovation Centre 2000
University of Glamorgan Gti 1999
42Table 13: Overview University Incubators
University Incubator Start Year
University of Glasgow Centre for Integrated Diagnostic Systems 2002
University of Glasgow West of Scotland Science Park 1983
University of Glasgow The Technology Complex 2001
University of Gloucestershire
University of Greenwich Medway Enterprise Hub 2006
University of Hertfordshire Innovation Centre 2003
University of Hudderseld Business Mine 2004
University of Hull University of Hull-Knowledge Exchange 2007
University of Hull Logistics Institute Incubation Oces 2007
University of Kent Canterbury Enterprise Hub 2004
University of Kent Medway Innovation Centre 2007
University of Leeds Leeds Innovation Centre 2000
University of Leicester
University of Lincoln Sparkhousestudios 2003
University of Liverpool MerseyBIO Incubator 2003
University of Liverpool Liverpool Science Park 2006
University of Manchester Bioscience Incubator 1999
University of Manchester Technology Centre One Central Park 2005
University of Manchester MBS Incubator 2002
University of Manchester North Campus Incubator 2004
University of Manchester Stockport Business Incubator CIC 2008
University of Manchester Manchester Science Park 1984
University of Manchester Daresbury Innovation Centre 2005
University of Northampton CLEO 2003 (closed 2007)
University of Northampton Portfolio Innovation Centre 2006
University of Northampton Chesham House Business Centre 2009
University of Nottingham
University of Northampton University of Nottingham Innovation Park 2008
University of Oxford Begbroke Centre for Innovation and Enterprise 2006
University of Oxford Oxford Science Park 1991
University of Plymouth Tamar Science Park Limited 1995
University of Plymouth Formation Zone 2007
University of Portsmouth
University of Reading Reading Enterprise Centre
University of Reading Science & Technology Centre 1999
University of Salford Technology House
University of Salford Innovation Forum
University of Sheeld Kroto Innovation Centre 2007
University of Sheeld The Sheeld Bioincubator 2006
University of Southampton University of Southampton Science Park 2003
University of Southampton SETsquared Business Acceleration Centre 2003
University of St Andrews
University of Stirling Innovation Park 1986 (closed)
University of Stirling SureStart 2003
University of Strathclyde Strathclyde University Incubator 1990
University of Strathclyde West of Scotland Science Park 1983
University of Sunderland St Peter's Gate 2004
University of Surrey Surrey Technology Centre 2002
University of Sussex Sussex Innovation Centre (SInC) 1996
University of Teesside University of Teesside 2001
University of the Arts, London
University of the West of England, Bristol UWE Ventures 2009
University of the West of Scotland
43Table 14: Overview University Incubators
University of Wales College, Newport
University of Wales Institute
University of Wales, Aberystwyth CRISALIS Germinator 2004
University of Wales, Aberystwyth Technium Aberystwyth 2005
University of Wales, Bangor Bangor Bioincubators 2003
University of Wales, Lampeter
University of Wales, Swansea Technium Digital 2003
University of Wales, Swansea Technium Sustainable Technologies 2005
University of Warwick The Venture Centre 1984
University of Westminster Innovation Labs 1999 (closed)
University of Winchester
University of Wolverhampton e-innovation Centre 2006
University of Wolverhampton First Base 2001
University of Wolverhampton SP/ARK 2004
University of Worcester
University of York The Innovation Centre 1995
University of York The Bio Centre 2003
University of York The IT Centre 2003
Writtle College Micro-Incubator 2005
York St John University
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